Ardant Du Picq

A New Knights Templar? (Part 4)

 

Maasai warriors hunting a lion

Although the primary mission of the original Knights Templar was military combat action, relatively few members were combatants.  The majority of its adherents acted in support positions to assist the knights and to manage the financial infrastructure of the organization.  Once Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, a leading Church figure, lent his support, the Templars became the favored charity in all of Christendom.  Templar headquarters in many lands received land, money and businesses.

In 1150, the original Knights Templar began generating letters of credit for pilgrims journeying to the Holy Land.  These pilgrims deposited their valuables with a local Templar office before embarking.  In return, he would receive a document indicating the value of the deposit; he would use that document upon arrival in the Holy Land to retrieve their funds in an amount of equal value.  In return, the Knights Templar received a small percentage of the wealth, an arrangement that was an early form of banking and may have been the first formal system to support the use of these forms of documents.  The system thus not only improved the safety of pilgrims by making them less attractive targets for thieves, but also contributed to the Templar coffers.

Today, a New Knights Templar organization would require a different system to meet a much-more complex world.  As before, the most efficient organization of the New Knights Templar would be by country, as there is no real reason to have an international control body.  The New Knights Templar is not going to defeat ISIS and other evil militant Islamic organizations alone.  They are not going to command large forces, disperse billions of dollars or compete against nation states on the world stage.  No, a New Knights Templar will probably evolve as a much smaller entity, consisting of numerous units, each of which would probably be no larger than regiment in strength (1,000 to 2,000 individuals.)  The organization may find that it has adequate volunteers from Country X to form a regiment; Country Y to form a battalion (500 individuals); and from Country Z only a company (100 individuals) can be formed.  Additionally, because of the norms, skills and heritage, the unit from Country Z may be a medical organization, while Country X is fielding an infantry unit.

Fielding by country provides several advantages.  First, there is generally no language barrier within a single country.  Second, there is a built-in support structure back home to reinforce those Knights Templar at the front.  Third, a nation’s laws and political objectives may change over time.  Should a nation shift its views against its citizens being members, the cut-off of volunteers from Country X will only affect the New Knights Templar units from Country X, not all units if citizens from Country X had been spread across the force.

The New Knights Templar would have three major ongoing tasks to accomplish, and accomplish well.  In each nation, the organization will need personnel to raise funds, help recruit, provide some type of military training (within the context of what is legal to do in that country), conduct supporting public affairs activities and work behind the scenes with political leaders to increase – or at least maintain – support for the organization.

A second group of New Knights Templar in each country would be responsible for the transportation of New Knights Templar personnel, and selected equipment, from the home country to the area of foreign operations.  This group would also procure selected equipment and ensure it was legally and properly transported; they would then “marry” this equipment to New Knights Templar volunteers on the ground, which would include equipment familiarization.  Finally, this second group would be responsible for re-deploying front line New Knights Templar to their home countries.

The third group, obviously, are those New Knights Templar are the actual fighters, translators, logisticians, medical personnel and civil affairs experts that actually go on a tour of duty overseas.  Each nation providing volunteers for a New Knights Templar will find its own best way to recruit volunteers.  One overarching principal will likely be that every volunteer can find an area in which to help; that all contributions are valuable; and that each volunteer must balance the degree of personal service in the organization with his or her ongoing personal and family commitments.  If those commits preclude service overseas, than whatever the volunteer can contribute should be valued.

For those volunteers that seek active overseas duty protecting the innocents and directly fighting the Evil, the sending countries would do well to remember Colonel Ardant Du Picq, a French Army officer and military theorist of the mid-nineteenth century.  Du Picq’s analyses stressed the vital importance, especially in contemporary warfare, of discipline and unit cohesion.  He also believed that the human element in war is more important than theories.  Before his death in combat in 1870, du Picq had already published Combat antique (Ancient Battle), which associates later expanded into the classic Etudes sur les combat: Combat antique et moderne, most often referred to by its common English title of Battle Studies, which was published in part ten years later, although the complete text did not appear until 1902.  A thorough study of all of du Picq’s thinking boils down to one of his fundamental truths:

“Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare attack a lion.   Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.”

New Knights Templar organizations should strongly consider recruiting volunteers from among four people who already know each other well; they could have served in their own nation’s military together; gone to school together; or in some manner already know each other.  They should deploy together, work together overseas and re-deploy together home.  New Knights Templar organizations will quickly find that individual replacements cause nothing but problems.  A group of four volunteers – perhaps that will be termed as its own “Lion Team” – will work well together, be that as a medical unit or direct combat formation.

Training opportunities for volunteers for combat units will undoubtedly be limited and expensive, both in the home nation and once the volunteers are deployed.  Therefore a second consideration for volunteer selection – at least for combat duty – is previous experience in a nation’s armed forces.  Combat veterans have a stabilizing effect that cannot be over-estimated.  opportunities to fully train on host nation soil may be limited, so the higher the level of skill a volunteer brings in, the better.  Additionally, the enemy that the New Knights Templar will face will have months, if not years, of their own combat experience, albeit most of it was against defenseless women and children and those who could not adequately defend themselves.  With the formation of a New Knights Templar, that will be about to change.  To be continued…

 

A New Knights Templar? (Part 4)2021-06-15T17:59:56-05:00

The Best Military Theorist

Many students at the National War College – and even a few folks today – have asked me who my favorite military theorist is.  Many scholars of military history, strategy and politics have heard of Carl Clausewitz and Sun Tzu and both were indeed influential thinkers.

Carl Clausewitz was a German officer and military theorist in the early 1800s, who stressed the moral and political aspects of war; we would say today that this included the psychological aspects of warfighting. His most notable work, Vom Kriege (On War), has been studied by thousands of military officers around the world; ironically, the book was unfinished at his death and may have been completed by his wife.  He stressed the dialectical interaction of diverse factors, noting how unexpected developments unfolding under the “fog of war” (i.e., in the face of incomplete, dubious, and often completely erroneous information and high levels of fear, doubt, and excitement) call for rapid decisions by alert commanders.  These special commanders were said to have a finger-tip feeling for war. 

Clausewitz also discussed the relationship between three elements that later became known as “Clausewitz’s trinity.”  These are “composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason.”

Clausewitz also wrote at length about the concept of center of gravity.  This process was to identify the enemy’s hub of all strength, in other words, what characteristic or element led him to victory.  It might be a strong alliance in support; it might be the enemy’s ground forces, etc.  Very rarely was the enemy’s center of gravity a single person or leader, although many intelligence efforts in the past focused on eliminating that one “indispensable” person.  The U.S. was caught in that trap when Seal Team Six killed Osama Bin Laden and many high-ranking leaders opined that this was the end of Al Qaeda; of course we know it was not.  Whenever you see a politician, or a senior military leader for that matter, not address the center of gravity of the enemy, you know that you are listening to a rank strategic amateur, regardless of his pay grade.

Sun Tzu was a Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher who lived in the Spring and Autumn Period of ancient China, about 500 BC.  He is traditionally credited as the author of The Art of War, an extremely influential ancient Chinese book on military strategy.  Sun Tzu has had a significant impact on Chinese and Asian history and culture, both as the author of The Art of War and as a legendary historical figure.  The Art of War presents a philosophy of war for managing conflicts and winning battles and is accepted as a masterpiece on strategy, frequently cited and referred to by generals and theorists.

The work very succinctly presents the tenets for developing and executing a strategy that will defeat the strategy of your opponent.   It is presented in lists and recommendations such as: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.”

Perhaps Sun Tzu’s most famous quotation has been: “It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”

While both these theorists have been extremely influential in modern history (and for Sun Tzu much longer), and while I have re-read each numerous times, my absolute favorite military theorist is Colonel Ardant Du Picq, a French Army officer and military theorist of the mid-nineteenth century whose writings – as they were later interpreted by other theorists in the First World War period – had a great effect on French military theory and doctrine.

Ardant du Picq was born at Périgueux, France on October 19, 1821.  On 1 October 1844, he graduated from the École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr, the French equivalent of the U.S. West Point and was commissioned a sub-lieutenant in the 67th Regiment of the Line.  As a captain, having previously transferred to the 9th Battalion of Foot Chasseurs, he saw action in the French expedition to Varna during the Crimean War, but he fell ill with cholera and was evacuated to France. Upon recovery, he rejoined his unit in front of Sevastopol and was captured during the storming of the central bastion of the fortress in September 1855.  Released in December 1855, he returned to active duty, first with the 100th Regiment of the Line and later as a major with the 16th Battalion of Foot Chasseurs.  He later served in Syria from August 1860 to June 1861, during the French intervention to restore order following Maronite-Druze sectarian violence.

Du Picq saw extensive service in Algeria from 1864 – 1866, and in February 1869 was selected colonel of the 10th Regiment of the Line.  At the outbreak of war with Prussia on July 15, 1870, he led his regiment to the front.  Directing his men along an elevated road on August 15, 1870, an overhead burst by a Prussian artillery shell fatally wounded him in both thighs and his stomach near Longeville-les-Metz.  He died four days later at the military hospital in Metz from his wounds.  Ardant du Picq’s last words were, “My wife, my children, my regiment, adieu!”

Before his death in 1870, du Picq had already published Combat antique (Ancient Battle), which associates later expanded into the classic Etudes sur les combat: Combat antique et moderne, most often referred to by its common English title of Battle Studies, which was published in part ten years later, although the complete text did not appear until 1902.

His analyses stressed the vital importance, especially in contemporary warfare, of discipline and unit cohesion.  Du Picq believed that the human element is more important than theories.  War was still more of an art than a science.  One popular quote demonstrating this conclusion drawn from numerous battle studies stated, “Nothing can wisely be prescribed in any army… without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat.”

Du Picq also thought that great strategists and leaders of men are marked by inspiration. “Generals of genius draw from the human heart ability to execute a surprising variety of movements which vary the routine; the mediocre ones, who have no eyes to read readily, are doomed to the worst errors.”

All of du Picq’s thinking, in my opinion, boils down to one of his fundamental truths:

“Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare attack a lion.   Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.”

Training, discipline, bravery, teamwork, independent action – everything a young leader needs to know to create a successful organization can be found by reading Ardant du Picq.

The Best Military Theorist2015-12-04T11:52:26-06:00
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