French MacLean, Author at The Fifth Field

About French MacLean

This author has not yet filled in any details.
So far French MacLean has created 264 blog entries.

A New Knights Templar? (Part 1)

New Knights Templar?

Nation-states are not the only potential actors on the stage against militant Islam. Nation states are slow to act; it often seems that ISIS is one or two steps ahead of any nation state would-be coalition against them. However, from their inception centuries ago, modern nation states desire a monopoly on violence. They are loathe to have other military forces on their sovereign territory and many, many nation states – including unfortunately some administrations in our own government – desire to limit even the ownership of weapons inside their society. Nation states are comfortable with their own military and police being armed, but not many are confident enough to allow their own citizens to own arms.

In the Middle Ages, nation states were just beginning to be formed from feudal society. Kings and queens still exerted power and, at least in much of Europe, the Roman Catholic Church delved deep into political issues.

Pope Urban II, for example, in March 1095, received an ambassador from the Byzantine Emperor requesting assistance against Muslim (Seljuk) Turks who had taken over most of formerly Byzantine Anatolia. That November at a great council, that would become known as the Council of Clermont, attended by numerous Italian, Burgundian and French bishops, the summoned the attending nobility and the people to wrest the Holy Land, and the eastern churches generally from the control of the Seljuk Turks. The Crusaders, those who went on the First Crusade to liberate the Holy Land, captured Jerusalem in 1099, but in most of the Crusade era, Muslim military forces held the upper hand in the region, making pilgrimages to the Holy Land uncertain in the best of circumstances.

In 1119, the “Poor Knights of Christ and the Temple of Solomon” were formed to help protect these pilgrims in their journey. These Knights Templar were officially endorsed by the Roman Catholic Church around 1129; beginning as a small group, they originally helped protect Christian pilgrims in the Holy Land and later became significant combat assets, fighting in numerous battles. A Cistercian abbot, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, soon popularized the Knights Templar in his manuscript New Knighthood.

Not all Knights Templar were warriors; most of their ranks were filled with those who would support – acquire resources which could be used to fund and equip the small percentage of Knights Templar who were fighting on the front lines. Often serving as a small shock force in an army that was predominantly non-Knights Templar, the warriors achieved successful results in many battles until 1187, when they were soundly defeated at Battle of the Horns of Hattin, where many were killed in combat and those that were captured were put to the sword. The order made a resurgence the next decades, but after the Siege of Acre in 1291, the Templars were, in the main, forced off the Holy Land and retreated to the island of Cyprus. A few stronghold fortresses remained, but by 1300 the order was clearly in decline.

Powerful bankers and advisors, the Knights Templar were often viewed with distrust by some in the nobility and the church. While they still had a base of operations in Cyprus, and controlled considerable financial resources, the Templars became an Order without a clear purpose or support, and this unstable situation contributed to their downfall. King Philip IV of France ordered the arrest of dozens of French Templars at dawn on Friday, October 13, 1307. Under torture, they confessed to numerous crimes. The Templars sought help from Pope Clement V; it was in vain. The predominant historical view is that King Philip was jealous of the Templars’ wealth and power, and frustrated by his massive debt to them, he sought to seize their financial resources by bringing blatantly false charges against them. After the Council of Vienne in 1312, Pope Clement V issued an edict officially dissolving the Knights Templar. Two years later, several leaders of the Order were burned at the stake. However, in their heyday, the Knights Templar had proven to be a formidable force in the protection of thousands of unarmed pilgrims seeking to fulfill religious requirements by visiting the Holy Land.

In future years, could a new version of the Knights Templar (perhaps called something different) of individuals from around the world, banding together in a para-military force, protect innocent non-combatants of every faith – including Islam – in the Middle East?

Although it would be portrayed as a “Christian Army” by the jihadists and some of the western secular media, could an organized group of defenders of the innocent (that included not only military capability but also doctors, nurses and civil engineers from many faiths who decided to stand up and protect those who cannot defend themselves) actually be a unifying factor in the region? Such a dynamic would not be a mercenary army; it would be a force of individuals of conscience motivated primarily by a desire to protect the would-be victims of militant Islam, fully cognizant of the brutal treatment they would receive if captured by ISIS elements, but motivated to fight nonetheless. Could a new Knights Templar embody what the United Nations first believed it could do, but that has now become so mired in politics that it is almost always a day late and a dollar short? Could a new Knights Templar make the conflict not just that of the United States and some selected other nation states, but one of the entire civilized world against the jihadists? Could a force of this nature — a new Knights Templar — with volunteers from around the globe, create this dynamic? To be continued…

A New Knights Templar? (Part 1)French MacLean2021-06-15T18:01:19-05:00

ISIS

Wars with religious undertones have occurred over recorded human history. Many of these conflicts have been characterized by acts of significant brutality, recorded all-too-frequently by chroniclers as “putting the population to the sword.” Today, these shocking accounts have morphed from the pages of history text to graphic beheadings and burning to death on videos on the internet.

The Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648 resolved the Thirty Years’ War, one of the longest and most destructive conflicts in European history – and initially a war between Christian Protestant and Christian Catholic states in the fragmenting Holy Roman Empire. Christians continued to brutally fight one another, most recently evident in the civil wars in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Islamic factions – Sunni and Shia – have fought each other almost from the start of Islam and continue to this day. Finally, the era of the Crusades (1095-1285) demonstrated the ferocity of Christian-Muslim conflict.

Western historians seem to fall into three categories concerning the character of this two-century medieval clash: some see the Crusades as part of a purely defensive war against Islamic conquest; others view the struggle as part of long-running conflict at the frontiers of Europe; a third tranche has concluded that the wars were caused by aggressive, papal-led expansion attempts by Western Christendom. Muslim historians – and more importantly the average Muslim man or woman on the street – have quite a different view. As far as the Muslims in the Middle East during those two centuries believed, the Crusades were simply the latest stage in Frankish imperialism that had already manifested itself in North Africa, Sicily and Spain.

However, what is most important is not what Christians and Muslims thought 800 years ago, but how they continue to view these events today. The Christian West has quite simply forgotten the Crusades. They are an event that happened, but not one that still elicits emotion. Almost no Christian holds a public grudge that a distant relation fighting in the Crusades was killed by Muslims. In short, there is no utility in modern western life to be concerned with just another increasingly distant chapter in a dusty history book. The opposite occurred in the Muslim world. Initially – at the time of these events – Muslim scholars believed that there was nothing of value to learn from the Christian/Frankish barbarians who came from Central and Western Europe. Not only were Muslim historians uninterested in what Christians did, there were also indifferent to what Christians thought. Muslim feelings – in the exact obverse of Christian views – seem to be more concerned with the Crusades today than they were in the centuries immediately following the wars. Today, Muslims recall the Crusades as an offensive Christian undertaking with one or more goals of: humiliating Islam; defeating Islam; eradicating Islam. The Muslim view of the Crusades is that it is the wound that will not heal; it is original sin that no Christian may wash away.

Relations between Islam and Christianity did not improve to a brotherly love level over the last several hundred years, but for the most part did not involve attempting to destroy the other en mass, although periodic religious wars in the Balkans were certainly extremely violent. However, the fire between Islam and Christianity/Judaism rekindled with the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. In fact, one could easily argue that the current war by militant Islam against Christianity and Judaism – now 66 years old – began on this date.

It has become popular to attribute current unrest in the Mideast to a lack of good governance by many nation states in the region (i.e. lack of adequate health care, rampant corruption, inability to protect citizens from crime, substandard education, lack of jobs, etc.) While problems in good governance certainly are a contributory factor, they are not the root cause of the violence. England has good governance and they have a large number of jihadists, and it is becoming evident that so does the United States.

The root cause of the death and destruction throughout an alarmingly high proportion of the Muslim world are the beliefs of a substantial number of the faithful that the Qur’an (Koran) calls on them to subjugate and kill non-Muslims as part of the expansion of Islamic faith and culture.

The idea of fighting for God, although not confined to Islam, has given service in Muslim terrorist organizations a special attraction, which leads to a discussion of the Center of Gravity of ISIS, Al Qaeda and all other militant Muslim groups, regardless of their name or home location. For our purposes, let us define militant Islam as either Muslim nation-state sponsored terrorism or non-nation state terrorism, directed at non-Muslim targets. Muslim on Muslim violence (Shia-Sunni) is certainly violent, but it is something a little different.

Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, believed that a fundamental requirement in war was to identify the enemy’s Center of Gravity and attack it vigorously. He stated in part, “the force at which our blow is to be aimed requires that our strength be concentrated to the utmost… therefore a major act of strategic judgment to distinguish these centers of gravity in the enemy’s forces and to identify their spheres of effectiveness.” This center of gravity, be it the bulk of the enemy’s army or other capability (although seldom an enemy leader), is the hub of all power and strength. Destroy it and the enemy collapses.

Listening to the Secretary of Defense and senior military generals talk about ISIS but never mention the term “center of gravity” is troubling. War is governed by certain tenets and principles and its nature is unchanging (although the character and conduct do change.)

It is this paper’s opinion that the strategic center of gravity of every militant Islamic organization, from small terrorist cells to large conventionally formed and equipped armies, is the magnetism of certain tenants of Islam that attract an almost inexhaustible number of recruits that are prepared to do violence to non-believers and even die for their cause in their quest to expand their religion into a caliphate under Islamic law.

Attacking this strategic center of gravity is a multi-faceted process. Over the long term, these select violent tenants of Islam must be “demagnetized” in an effort by which they lose their appeal to potential recruits. It will be a complex process, as we must create the conditions in which they will convince themselves that violence is not the answer. A second way to attack this hub of all power, which should begin immediately, is to simply kill the jihadists in as large numbers as possible. Unfortunately, that brutal solution may extend to succeeding generations seeking to emulate their elders, if these young jihadist “wannabees” cannot be convinced to drop the sword.

However, there is an additional course of action to only killing current jihadists and that is in the realm of psychological warfare. We must discover that which frightens the jihadist. What causes him to wake up in the middle of the night screaming in terror? Most religions and cultures have their own boogie men, infant-snatchers and vampire lore; how can we use these legends to psychologically dislocate the jihadists and their core supporters?

We must additionally separate the foot-soldier jihadists from their leaders. Our information campaign must create the story that the sons of these leaders rarely become suicide bombers (that is only for the lesser value men) and that the leaders often skim millions of dollars of wealth from the cause for their own personal benefit. More importantly, we must study with responsible Imams those terrorist acts that will cause the jihadist to be “excommunicated” from the faith and that there is no heaven for these men – and ensure that information is widely disseminated, if only to peel away some of the less-radical foot soldiers.

Not all jihadist groups are created equal and we must prioritize the levels of danger presented by each. Concerning the current iteration of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL), the center of gravity at the operational level is the group’s ability to generate significant funds to procure weapons, supplies and influence; the group is thought to have at least $2 billion and the sum is growing daily. Whether this is destroying or capturing oilfields under ISIS control, hacking into ISIS financial accounts or closing the flow of the Hawala money transfer system, it is imperative that ISIS be deprived of significant funding. This is because the leaders in militant Islam understand that while they can use a strategy of attrition to possibly defeat U.S. and western forces operating in the Middle East (and thus wearing down the American home front with seemingly endless casualties) – ISIS needs nuclear weapons to truly go on the offensive and actually expand the caliphate. This means purchasing such weapons, as ISIS does not have the scientific or technical ability to make their own. Make no mistake; when terrorists, with an end of days’ Yawm al-Qiyāmah philosophy, obtain nuclear weapons, it is only a matter of time before they gladly use them.

Unfortunately, this current war may well last into the next century. This is because breaking the magnetism of those violent tenants of Islam will require a Muslim “reformation,” whatever that looks like, powerful Fatwas and active dissuasion of violence from “the pulpit.” Islam must go through a self-generated process to eliminate the violent portions of its theology, while at the same time healing the rift between Sunnis and Shiites and that will take time – decades at the least.

To begin a strategic campaign, we must first be able to identify the enemy in order to tailor a strategy that will be successful. Militant Islam is not workplace violence; it is not a tiny minority unsupported by the vast majority of Muslims. Militant Islam cannot co-exist. It is not primarily a law enforcement issue; it is war. At the current time, militant Islamic prisoners of war cannot be reliably “cured” of violent tendencies; they are killing machines. That is why terms such as degrade are imprecise and dangerous. Despite the protestations of the barstool brigadiers and armchair admirals that never fired a shot in anger, the nature of war is violence and the character and conduct of this war will also be violent. It is no coincidence that Islam never spread northeast. In 1219, Genghis Khan invaded Khwarezmia, which was governed by Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad, and during the conquest killed millions of people across the land. The Mongol adversaries took a back seat to no one in their application of violence and Islam never forgot. In most wars, the victor actually does kill his way out of it, inflicting so much pain on the enemy that the opponent surrenders or agrees to terms.

The second objective of this initial strategic campaign is not to lose before we have marshalled the will and resources to win. There are four conditions that could cause a situation that would preclude ultimate victory. The United States loses if it simply quits the fight and withdraws inward, sustains a significant weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack that puts the national economy in peril, fails to support Israel to such a degree that Israel is destroyed, or seeks to accommodate the tenants of militant Islam such as Sharia Law. The current administration may feel that it does not have the time left or the stomach to do what must be done offensively. However, it can still make a contribution defensively: to protect the country from a WMD attack over the next two years, by first stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The next administration and the next generation of political leaders have their own roles to play and will have to ramp up the struggle. First, both major political parties must go against their own petty self-interests and work to unify the country as one. Second, taking counsel of sound senior military advice, they must rebuild the U.S. military to provide those capabilities that will prove successful in the fight – such as an even greater increase in special operations forces and intelligence gathering capabilities. Both support the operational Center of Gravity of the United States military – the ability to quickly and accurately place overwhelming fires anywhere in the world on land, sea and air across the spectrum of conflict.

Finally, as we contemplate a lengthy war, we must consider the composition of the military. The nation made a mistake after Nine-Eleven and did not implement actions to elicit shared sacrifice from our population. The last dozen years of war have been fought by the volunteer professional military, often described as the one-half of one percent. Nothing like the old Victory-Bond drives came into being after that fateful September morning. No special war taxes were implemented. No common, shared sacrifice was demanded. To a great degree, the conflict has been fought with a very small tip of the spear, albeit a razor-sharp one.

The nation needs to debate returning to a draft. We currently have numerous ethnic and racial groups that have little contact with or understanding of other groups; this leads to senseless mistrust and disunity. Societal evolution has led to many children raised in one-parent families and having no sense of either authority or of the collective good. Militant gangs replace absent fathers. Violence on America’s streets is rampant; Chicago, based on dozens of gang-related shootings every weekend, has acquired the new deadly moniker of “Chiraq” and this viciousness is not confined to large cities. Returning to the draft – and this does not mean deploying draftees overseas to fight jihadists; the character of the conflict is such that we can do that with a professional core – would produce shorter-term soldiers, who can assist with natural disasters at home, guard the borders of the country and ensure that all Americans have a stake in the outcome of the war. Equally important, we might be able to save what is appearing to be a lost generation.

For too long we have used terms such as target servicing, degrading capabilities and incarceration so as not to offend the ill-placed sensibilities of some in the media and the general public. Again returning to Clausewitz, the theorist wrote, “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat the enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds; it is a fallacy that must be exposed: War is such a dangerous business that mistakes that come from kindness are the very worst.”

We must contemplate unpleasant measures if we are to defeat an enemy that is as brutal and tenacious as militant Islam. CIA estimates go as high as 31,000 active enemy fighters, while Kurdish sources put the number at 200,000. On the legal front, we must engage the international law system to emplace laws that take away as many human rights of terrorists as possible; we should attempt to deny the terrorists all rights under the Geneva Conventions. Given that on the battlefield jihadists often pretend to surrender only to attack when our guard is lowered, that we are often loath to use the death penalty in judicial proceedings, that terrorists recruit new terrorists in prison and that released terrorists from Guantanamo confinement are likely to return to violence, we must examine our own procedures and rules to determine when it is simply too dangerous to capture them.

We should also contemplate closing confinement facilities, not because of the tired arguments that these centers serve as recruitment propaganda, but rather that the prisoners in them remain in the public eye. They write letters; they are potential bargaining chips such as the five Taliban leaders that were released at the stroke of a pen in 2014. We need to develop a system where uncertainty creeps into the minds of the terrorists. We should never return the remains of deceased terrorists to their relatives; in fact, we should never confirm what has happened or not happened to them when they disappear from the battlefield. We should not even give them a Muslim burial or place them in marked graves; their brutal acts caused them to forfeit that consideration (we did that with executed Nazi war criminals.) Additionally, since it is only a matter of time before the terrorists figure out how to create biological suicide “bombers” infected with Ebola, Small Pox or other deadly contagious diseases, we should assume that every dead terrorist is already infected and his remains should be handled accordingly.

Along these lines, we must immediately stop telling the jihadists what we will or will not do and where we will do it. We must refrain from explaining in the public forum, for example, why ISIS troops massing at the Kurdish town of Kobani in Syria are becoming lucrative targets for attacks from the air; let the enemy find out the hard way that his tactics are in error. Uncertainty is our friend, causing the enemy to believe they must defend everywhere. As strategist Sun-Tzu opined: “To defend everywhere is to defend nowhere.”

ISIS/ISIL and Al Qaeda, left to their own devices, became killing machines. It will take a superior killing machine to drive home the terrible conclusion to every jihadist and every jihadist-supporter that there will be no glory in murdering innocents and no glory in dying for a hateful God. There will be no jail cell or halfway house, from which they might someday be released, for the purveyors of evil. There will only be a certain, agonizing, lonely, pointless death in the shadows of darkness in a manner that precludes even their memory from being cherished by their family and friends…their entire corporal and spiritual self will simply disappear for all time.

ISISFrench MacLean2015-11-16T18:29:33-06:00

88th Infantry Regiment

This specific pistol – a Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken (DWM)-produced Model 1908 9mm Luger – was produced in March 1915. It has the serial number 3336 c. The weapon has a unit marking on the front grip strap of 88. R.M.G. 48. This marking corresponds to the 88th Infantry Regiment, specifically the Machine Gun Company. The last digits, 48, indicate that it was the 48th weapon in the company’s arms room, undoubtedly belonging to a machine-gunner.

The 2. Nassauisches Infanterie-Regiment (2nd Nassau Infantry Regiment) was formed by the Duke of Nassau on August 13, 1808, when the Duchy of Nassau was an ally of Napoleon. It went to Spain, where it fought for the French in the storming of the Mesas de Ibor and the Battle of Talavera. In December 1813, after Nassau left the alliance with France, the regiment fought on the side of the allies against Napoleon. The unit fought at the key position of Hougoumont at the Battle of Waterloo. In 1848, it fought in the Baden Revolution and the following year fought against Denmark in the First Schleswig War. In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, it fought with the southern Germany forces against Prussia. After Prussia’s victory, the regiment was incorporated into the Prussian Army as the 88th Infantry Regiment (Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 88.) In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, the regiment fought at Weißenburg (August 4), Wörth (August 6), Sedan (September 1), Mont Valerien (January 19, 1871), and at the Siege of Paris from September 22, 1870 to January 28, 1871. After the war, the regimental headquarters was located at the Mainz Fortress, moving to Diez from 1894-1897.

By a Prussian imperial order on September 19, 1913, King Konstantin of Greece was appointed to be the ceremonial head of the Regiment, so the unit received the K with a red crown for the their epaulets. The regiment was part of the 21st Infantry Division (Major General Ernst von Oven) was part of the XVIII Corps (Lieutenant General Heinrich von Schenk) at Frankfurt am Main. In August 1914, it was part of the Fourth Army (Duke Albrecht of Württemberg), entering Luxemburg on August 10 and Belgium on August 12. It fought at Neuf Château on August 20, at Bertrix and Orgeo on August 22, at Matton on August 24 and at Brévilly on August 26. The division crossed the Meuse River on August 28.

During the month of September 1914, the 21st Infantry Division took part on the First Battle of the Marne between Vitry-le-Francois and Sermaize-les-Bains. It then retired toward Rheims, where it fought northwest of the city from September 15 to 20. In October, it was reassigned with the XVIII Corps to the Second Army (Field Marshal Karl von Bülow) and was located at Roye.

The 88th Infantry Regiment remained with the 21st Infantry Division at Roye until March 1915, when it transferred to help form the 56th Infantry Division. The new division concentrated near Vouziers and then went south of Ripont on the Champagne Front in April. In early May, the 56th Division moved to the Eastern Front as the reserve for the Eleventh Army.

The 56th Infantry Division participated in the combined German-Austrian Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive in late May, initially as the army reserve, at the Battle of Jaroslav on May 18 and the Battle of Rudka on June 18, suffering heavy losses in both. The division also fought in the breakthrough at Lubaczow and the Battle of Lemberg, ending on June 22. At the end of June 1915, the division was transported back to the Western Front to Valenciennes, forming part of the high command reserve in the Second Army and later in Army Detachment Falkenhausen.

The division saw action from September through November 1915 in the Second Battle of Champagne, initially in the sector of Maison de Champagne, as part of the VIII Reserve Corps (Major General Friedrich Fleck) at Aure. Infantry losses alone in the division during the battle were 107 officers and 5,968 men. It remained in the trench lines at Champagne until April 1916, then went into reserve with the Third Army.

On May 25, 1916 the division entered the Battle of Verdun, fighting in the struggle for the Dead Man’s Hill (le Mort Homme). The regiment reinforced le Mort-Homme, helped capture the village of Cumières, remaining at Verdun until July 17, 1916. German records classified the fighting of May 25-29 as the “Kämpfe um den Toten Mann” and the fighting from May 29-July 17 as the “Stellungskämpfe auf dem Toten Mann.” The division then moved north to the Flanders and Artois sectors of the front and remained there until August 23, 1916.

The division joined the Battle of the Somme the following day; it would fight near Ginchy at Delville Wood, until September 9 launching a bloody counterattack northeast of the woods on August 31 against the British 7th Division.

The 56th Division was then pulled out of the line to receive reinforcements in October 1916 and returned to the trenches in Champagne, near Rheims. On November 1, 1916, the high command placed the division in the reserve for Army Group “Crown Prince Rupprecht von Bayern.”

The 56th Division returned to the final phase of the Battle of the Somme on November 13 near Pys under the command of the German First Army. On the south bank of the Ancre valley, the 56th Division was relieving the 58th Division on November 18 as the British began their attack that would later be known as the Battle of the Ancre – the final large British attack of the Battle of the Somme. The German positions began 300 meters north of the British “Regina Trench” at Alter Dessauer Riegel (Old Dessau Defense Line), which was held by patrols as a decoy away from Dessauer Riegel – Leipziger Riegel (Leipzig Defense Line), the main line of defense 150 meters back in Kleine Mulde (Little Hollow), an eastern extension of Stallmulde (Barn Hollow.) Stallmulde was 650 meters south of Baum Mulde (Tree Hollow.) Some 100 meters behind these defenses lay Grimmaer Riegel (Grimm Defense Line,) which the Germans were able partly to reinforce before November 18. The last line of defense was Grandcourt Riegel (Grandcourt Defense Line) and machine-gun nests along Baum Mulde. The British attack, in frigid weather made worse by sleet, got forward 550 meters beyond Beaucourt, despite many casualties caused by massed German machine-gun fire and local counter-attacks. By the evening, German defenders held ground either side of the Pys-Courcelette road, in an arc between Dessauer Riegel and the east end of Regina Trench.

The division remained in positional warfare along the Somme and in Flanders until March 15, 1917. It then faced the British offensive at the Battle of Arras in April and May, and then after more time in the trench lines in Flanders, Artois and the Argonne, it returned to Verdun on August 13, 1917 at Chaume Wood-Baumont and Cheppy Wood. The division remained at Verdun until April 16, 1918, and then returned to the Flanders region.

In 1918, the handwriting was on the wall for the German Army unless it took to the offense. The spring offensive, known to commanders as the “Kaiserschlacht” (Kaiser’s Battle), began with an effort in the north to drive a wedge between the British and French Army sectors at La Fère, southeast of Saint-Quentin, France, commencing March 21. As weather conditions began to improve after the winter, a second phase of the offensive, codenamed Operation Georgette in the German plan was the start of the Battle of the Lys. The offensive was launched against the Allied line in the low-lying, British-held sector on both sides of the Lys River in French Flanders.

At 02:30 hours on April 25, 1918 over 250 batteries of German guns of the Fourth Army opened up on Allied artillery positions of the British First Army with a mixture of gas and high explosive, marking the beginning of the Second Battle for Kemmel. For the next two hours they concentrated solely on destroying gun emplacements. After a short pause, at 05:00 hours the German barrage was switched to the French front line. Opposite a single French division (which had relieved British units at Kemmel Ridge) were amassed three and a half German divisions, including the 56th Division. An hour of such a furious bombardment was considered sufficient by the Germans and at 06:00 hours they launched their infantry to the attack. By 07:10 hours, the 56th Division had captured Kemmel Hill, southwest of Ypres, Belgium.

The division continued to fight in Flanders near Ypres in the vicinity of the Yser and Lys Rivers as part of the German Fourth Army (General Friedrich Bertram Sixt von Arnim.) It ended the war in battle before the Antwerp-Maas defensive line. From December 26-31, 1918, the regiment demobilized at Bad Orb. In total during the war, the division spent thirteen months at Verdun, as well as heavy fighting along the Somme, in the Champagne region and north in Flanders. Total killed in action in the 88th Infantry Regiment from 1914 to 1918 were 127 officers and 3,934 enlisted men. Commanders of the 56th Infantry Division included Major General Hans Schach von Wittenau (until June 30, 1915), Major General Leo Sontag (until April 22, 1916), Major General Karl Franz von Wichmann (until July 2, 1918) and Major General Helmuth von Maltzahn.

One of the strongest forces militating toward adoption of the machine gun in German service was Kaiser Wilhelm II, well-known as a technophile with a strong interest in modern weapons. Throughout the testing period, the Kaiser exerted his influence to overcome the hidebound indifference to automatic weapons within the Prussian Army’s command levels. During the period of the Second Empire (1871 – 1918,) Germany was composed of quasi-independent states, each of which, while having an overall fealty to the Kaiser, fielded its own armed forces. As a result, the German forces in World War I actually consisted of the armies of the various states, including those of Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony. Of these, the Prussian Army was by far the largest, and in wartime the armies of the smaller states were subordinated to the Prussian General Staff. Kaiser Wilhelm II had long championed the Maxim gun as the best available automatic weapon. Despite this royal patronage, things moved very slowly. The Imperial General Staff of the 1890’s was heavy with officers who had fought the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Their experiences led the General Staff to a collective belief that the machine gun was of use only within certain narrow tactical parameters (such as fortification defense or colonial warfare against poorly armed and led native hordes.) Kaiser Wilhelm II thought differently; and the Kaiser would be proven correct.

Machine guns quickly proved their worth and within a year, the Supreme Command decided that each infantry battalion would have its own machine gun company, in addition to the regimental machine gun company, although fielding the guns in sufficient numbers took an additional year. When the war began in August 1914, approximately 12,000 MG 08s were available to battlefield units; production, at numerous factories, was however markedly ramped up during wartime. In 1914 some 200 MG 08s were produced each month; by 1916—once the weapon had established itself as the pre-eminent defensive battlefield weapon—the number had increased to 3,000; and a year later to 14,400 per month.

The Model 1908 (Maschinengewehr 08) was an adaptation of Hiram S. Maxim’s original 1884 Maxim gun. The weapon was so-named after 1908, its year of adoption. It could reach a firing rate of up to 400 rounds per minute using 250-round fabric belts of 7.92x57mm ammunition, although sustained firing would lead to overheating. The weapon was water-cooled using a jacket around the barrel that held approximately one gallon of water. Using a separate attachment sight with range calculator for indirect fire, the MG 08 could be operated from cover, such as on the reverse slope of a hill. Additional telescopic sights were also developed and used in quantity during the war.

Above is the Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken (DWM)-produced Model 1908 9mm Luger made in March 1915. It has the serial number 3336 c. It has a mismatched magazine that has serial number 2689. Below is the front strap with the unit marking of 88. R.M.G. 48.

88th Infantry RegimentFrench MacLean2016-05-18T07:16:00-05:00

53rd Infantry Regiment – Vauxstürmer!

53rd Infantry Regiment Luger

A luger that fought at Verdun. This specific pistol – a Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken (DWM)-produced Model 1908 9mm Luger – was produced in 1915. It has the serial number 1430 d on the barrel and upper receiver and 741 d on the lower receiver. The weapon has a unit marking on the front grip strap of 53. R. M.G. 39. This marking corresponds to the 53rd Infantry Regiment, specifically the Machine Gun Company. The last digits, 39, indicate that it was the 39th weapon in the company’s arms room, undoubtedly belonging to a machine-gunner. Throughout Germany, the regiment – along with the 158th Infantry Regiment – received the nickname of Vauxstürmer, “Fort Vaux attacker” after seizing this key French fort during the Battle of Verdun in 1916.

A machine gun or, better, group of machine guns, could deny the enemy safe access to a chosen area of the battlefield. They could do this to ranges of one mile or more. At closer ranges, machine guns could sweep enemy parapets, fire on fixed lines and directions, or conduct night fire on lines set during daylight. Fired from flanking positions, to catch advancing enemy troops in enfilade, they were particularly deadly. This is because machine-gun fire is far more deadly than rifle fire. The gun’s mount gives it superb precision and absorbs its recoil. Also, , once the gun has been ‘laid’, its aim cannot be disturbed by the effects of fear or excitement on its gunner. Machine guns are fired in bursts, to avoid overheating, in which the bullets do not follow precisely the same trajectory, but instead form a ‘cone of fire.’ Where this cone intersects with the ground a ‘beaten zone’ is formed: an elliptical area over which the bullets are distributed. This ‘beaten zone’ is frequently better termed a ‘zone of death.

In 1914, most infantry regiments had a machine gun company equipped with six Model 1908 guns. Each company was comprised of two officers, 95 non-commissioned officers and other ranks, 45 horses (each gun was transported by two), three ammunition wagons, one field kitchen, one store wagon, one fodder wagon and one baggage wagon. There was also one extra machine gun, also drawn by two horses. A machine gun section consisted of one gun and six men. A corporal commanded the team; other members were the 1st gunner, 2nd assistant gunner (who helped carry ammunition), 3rd gunner (who helped carry ammunition), and the 4th and 5th gunners to drag the gun for short distances.

Machine guns quickly proved their worth and within a year, the Supreme Command decided that each infantry battalion would have its own machine gun company, in addition to the regimental machine gun company, although fielding the guns in sufficient numbers took an additional year. When the war began in August 1914, approximately 12,000 MG 08s were available to battlefield units; production at numerous factories ramped up during wartime. In 1914, some 200 MG 08s were produced each month; by 1916 – once the weapon had established itself as the pre-eminent defensive battlefield weapon – the number increased to 3,000; a year later to 14,400 per month.

The Model 1908 (Maschinengewehr 08) was an adaptation of Hiram S. Maxim’s original 1884 Maxim gun. The weapon was so-named after 1908, its year of adoption. It could reach a firing rate of up to 400 rounds per minute using 250-round fabric belts of 7.92x57mm ammunition, although sustained firing would lead to overheating. The weapon was water-cooled using a jacket around the barrel that held one gallon of water. Using a separate sight with range calculator for indirect fire, the MG 08 could be operated from cover, such as on the reverse slope of a hill. Additional telescopic sights were also developed and used in quantity during the war. The gun weighed 58 pounds; the water as coolant nine pounds and the tripod 85 pounds.

The gun’s practical range was estimated at some 2,200 yards up to an extreme range of 3,900 yards. The MG 08 was mounted on a sled mount when in firing position; for short distances near the front line, it could be ferried between locations either on carts or else carried above the men’s shoulders in the manner of a stretcher. Pre-war production was by Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken in Berlin and the government arsenal at Spandau (so that the gun was often referred to as a Spandau MG 08.) During the war, it earned the nickname the “Devils Paintbrush,” based on the fact that the weapon could – and often did – literally mow down hundreds of charging enemy soldiers in no-man’s land.

The 5. Westfälisches Infanterieregiment Nr. 53 (5th Westphalian Infantry Regiment 53) was formed on July 4, 1860 in Münster in the Prussian province of Westphalia. In 1864, it fought against Denmark in the Second Schleswig War, participating as part of the 13th Infantry Division at the pivotal Battle of Dybbøl. Four officers in the regiment won the Pour le Mérite decoration for bravery; the unit suffered 45 killed in action during the war. In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, it fought with the “Division Goeben” in the “Main Army” in southern Germany in the Battle of Aschaffenburg, Battle of Tauberbischofsheim and the Battle of Gerchsheim, fighting against Bavarian forces that were allied to Austria at the time. Thirty-three soldiers in the regiment died in the war. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, the regiment fought as part of the 14th Infantry Division (VII Army Corps) at the Battle of Spicheren (August 6, 1870,) Battle of Colombey-Nouilly (August 14, 1870,) and Battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat (August 18.) Thirteen regimental officers and 73 men were killed in action in the war. After the war, the regiment had its headquarters at Münster, Paderborn, Aachen, Jülich and Köln.

Ceremonial heads of the Regiment included Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm beginning in 1864; after he became the Prussian Kaiser, the regiment received the nickname “Sons of the Crown” and the unit began wearing epaulets with a large crown adorned (left), the only regiment in the army with solely a crown on their insignia. In 1898, the sister of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Viktoria, the Princess of Schaumburg-Lippe, became the honorary regimental commander.

At the start of World War I, the unit – now known as Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 53, (53rd Infantry Regiment) was originally subordinated to the 14th Infantry Division. The division, part of the German Second Army (Colonel General Karl von Bülow), VII Army Corps (General of Cavalry Karl von Einem), fought at the Siege of Liege (August 5-16, 1914), the Battle of Charleroi (August 22-23, 1914), the Battle of St. Quentin (August 1914) and the First Battle of the Marne (September 1914.) The initial aim of von Bülow’s army, which comprised 320,000 men, was to seize the city of Liege (Lüttich), gateway to Belgium, which blocked the narrow gap between the “Limburg appendix” and the Ardennes, the best entrance into Belgium. However Liege was defended by a ring of twelve heavily armed forts built on high ground in the 1880s, six on each side of the Meuse River, each 2-3 miles apart, and some 3-6 miles from the city itself. The forts contained a total of 400 retractable guns, up to 210mm in size.

Attacking from the north, the 53rd Infantry Regiment (part of the 27th Infantry Brigade) seized the high ground west of Fort Barchon on the night of August 5-6, 1914. However, the German infantry forces made little progress and after trying zeppelin bombing attacks, the Germans introduced a weapon which had until that point remained unknown to the Allies, Austrian-built 17-inch howitzers. With the significant aid of the howitzers and a pair of Krupp-made “Big Bertha gun” (a 420mm Gamma Mortar siege howitzer) the forts were finally taken on August 16.

In March 1915, the Supreme Command created the 50th Infantry Division transferring in the 53rd Infantry Regiment, the 158th Infantry Regiment and the 39th Fusilier Regiment. Initially, the division was equipped with captured Russian artillery, outdated rifles and inferior gasmasks, but over the next months was modernized. In May 1915, the division was engaged in mine warfare in the positional fighting in the Champagne Front south of Somme-Py. From June to October 10, 1915, the division occupied the sector of Tahure, seeing action in the Second Battle of Champagne as part of the VIII Reserve Corps (Major General Paul Fleck.) From September 22 to October 10, 1915, the 53rd Infantry Regiment suffered casualties of 56 officers and 2,583 men. Brigadier General Georg von Engelbrechten was the division commander.

The division subsequently departed the front and reorganized near Vouziers and Juniville until November 7, when it returned to action in the Prosnes-Prunay sector (east of Rheims), where it remained until April 1916. The 50th Infantry Division then deployed to the Battle of Verdun, where it recorded its greatest glories of the war. On Friday, April 14, 1916, the 50th Infantry Division arrived to strengthen the XV Army Corps (General of Infantry Berthold von Deimling) near Fort Vaux, making preparations for continuing the battle. On Monday, May 1 the German attack on Fort Vaux began, the intent of the army command to clear the French lines in the Bois de la Caillette first before the fort is actually attacked. However, by Sunday, May 7, it became clear that the German attack had failed again. The French artillery fire, led by observation balloons and aircraft, proved too strong. Prior to the assault, the men in the regiment had practiced assault techniques.

The Germans tried again during the month, inching closer and on Thursday, June 1, 1916, following a lengthy bombing and with the use of a number of flame-throwers, the Germans finally regained command of the Bois de la Caillette. The Bois Fumin, situated southwest of the village of Vaux, was also taken with the effect that the German troops in front of Fort Vaux were no longer controlled by the flanking French fire from the Bois de la Caillette and the Bois Fumin. After this maneuver, the German attack focused on Fort Vaux, a medium-sized fort generally accounting for a garrison of 250 men, but now accommodating some 600. The commander, Major Sylvain Raynal, suspected a large attack soon: in the morning the fort was caught in a rain of shells, Raynal counting 1,500 to 2,000 direct hits an hour.

German machine guns – very likely including the gun crew to which this Luger belonged – began firing to isolate Fort Vaux from possible French reinforcements from the south. The attack began at 4:00 a.m., Friday, June 2, and soon assault groups of the 53rd Infantry Regiment, under the command of Major Hans von Troilo, and the 158th Infantry Regiment (Major Kühl) were able to surround the fort almost completely, seizing a few hallways inside as well. French soldiers inside the fort stubbornly defended. On Sunday, June 4, to smoke out the French, the Germans brought up their flame-throwers, but the attempt fails, as wind currents forced the smoke out of the fort and obstructed the attackers in their actions. The French again launched a few counter-attacks, but were stymied by German machine guns and reinforcements, who forced the attackers back in a man-to-man fight. The Germans were again hindered in their movement by the French bombardment. The machine gun company of the 53rd Infantry Regiment was commanded by Lieutenant Werner Müller.

On Monday, June 5, inch by inch, the Germans forced their way into the fort where the French, behind a barricade of sandbags, keep up a stout defense. Major Raynal organized the defense in a heroic manner, but was concerned about the limited amount of drinking water available within the fort. The water tank contains less water than the gauge glass indicated and the water ration of 1 liter a day per person was reduced to just 1/8 liter. The wounded received double this amount. Raynal sent carrier pigeons with messages begging for reinforcements. A company managed to reach the fort, but of the original 170 men, only 26 survived. The Germans attempted to blow up the fort with demolition charges, but the attempt fails due to French artillery fire from the nearby-situated Fort Souville.

By Tuesday, June 6, the situation in the fort was terrible. In much of the fort, it was pitch dark. Panic attacks started, when a German gas attack was suspected, but it was a false alarm. The men were going mad with thirst, licking condensed water off the walls and some drinking their own urine. The stench was unbearable because the latrines were out of reach; Raynal finally decided to surrender. The next day, a white flag appeared on top of the fort and a French orderly delivered to Lieutenant Kurt Rackow, the German commander of the lead company of the 158th Infantry Regiment, a letter from Major Raynal, requesting an honorary surrender of his garrison. This was granted and the garrison surrendered in a military correct fashion; arms presented. The Germans treated the defeated French with respect: souvenirs were exchanged and photographs taken. The German Crown Prince Wilhelm, who would later review the victorious 53rd Infantry Regiment after the battle (see photo above) received Raynal with full honors, expressed his admiration for the heroic opposition and presented Raynal with a sword as a mark of distinction. For several weeks, the regiment remained near Fort Vaux, repelling several French attacks.

German records classified the fighting of the division of June 2 as the “Erstürmung von Damloup; Erstürmung von Fort Vaux” and fighting from June 3-June 7 as the “Kämpfe in und bei Fort Vaux; Kämpfe südlich Fort Vaux, Berg-Wald, Laufee Wald.” The division’s fight on June 21 was listed in German records as the “Erstürmung der Batterie A und des Steinbruchs südwestlich Fort Vaux.” The division’s battle on July 3 earned a recording of “Erstürmung der hohen Batterie de Damloup.” From June 1-9, the 53rd Infantry Regiment suffered five officers and 54 enlisted men killed in action and seven officers, 226 enlisted men wounded in action.

Exhausted by these battles, the division was sent to rest and reorganized in the vicinity of Étain in July, later occupying the calm sectors of the Woëvre. At the end of July, the 50th Infantry Division went back into line at Verdun, 500 yards south of Fort Vaux. It launched an attack on August 1 at the Bois de La Laufée, and defended against the French offensives of August 8 and October 24, suffering heavy losses, holding this sector until November. On just October 24-25, the regiment suffered 39 enlisted men killed in action and three officers and 107 enlisted men wounded in action. German records classified the fighting of the division during this period as the “Stellungskämpfe vor Verdun.” The division was then ordered to the Argonne, where it took responsibility for a sector at Vauquois.

Withdrawn from the Argonne on February 15, 1917, the division remained at rest in the area of Saulces-Champenoise until the end of March, then in the camp at Sissonne, then at Thenailles, near Vervins (beginning of April.) It was concentrated on April 8 in the Aisne Sector under the Seventh Army; it went into action at Juvincourt-et-Damary and there underwent the French attack of April 15, that became known as the Second Battle of the Aisne. After a French breakthrough by the XXXII Corps against the German 5th Reserve Infantry Division, a counterattack by the 50th Infantry Division, under Major General von Engelbrechten saved the day and stopped the enemy advance. After heavy losses, it was relieved at the end of the month and went for reorganization to Nizy le Comte, near the Sissonne Camp. About May 10, 1917, the division went back into line east of Allement on the Chemin des Dames. It was sent to rest in July in the vicinity of Mons en Laonnois, Coucy les Eppes and Parfondru. At the beginning of August, it came back to the Chemin des Dames. Following the French offensive at the Battle of Malmaison, the 50th Infantry Division retired on November 1, to the north of the Ailette River toward Neuville (outside of Chamouille) and was still occupying this sector in December 1917.

The 50th Infantry Division was withdrawn from line near Ailles (west of Craonne) on January 9, 1918, and moved to the Chimay area, where it arrived on January 14. It remained here for a month and trained in open warfare for the upcoming “Kaiserschlacht” (Kaiser’s Battle.) The division then moved to the La Capelle-Fontenelle area for rest and further training.

In the middle of March, the division, part of the German Eighteenth Army’s IX Army Corps, moved to the front, and on March 21, 1918, attacked west of St. Quentin as part of Operation Michael; it captured the village of Holnon during the day, Étreillers on March 22, Hangest-en-Santerre on March 29 and reached Moreuil on the Avre River southeast of Amiens on March 30. The division withdrew about April 1, after having suffered severe losses, and went to rest, refit, and train in the Lassigny region.

On May 27, 1918, as part of the German Seventh Army (Colonel General Max von Boehn) in the Blücher-Yorck Offensive (which became known as the Third Battle of the Aisne,) the 50th Infantry Division attacked near Craonne, reached Pontavert toward noon and crossed the Aisne River. The next day it crossed the Vesle River west of Breuil sur Vesle and continued to the south, where it repelled a French counterattack. On May 30, it reached Goussancourt, and then the Marne River east of Dormans. After having suffered severe losses, it was relieved by the 28th Reserve Infantry Division during the night of June 12-13, and went to rest and refit near Laon.

Brigadier General Friedrich von Derschau assumed command of the division on July 9. On July 19, 1918, the division was thrown into line just southwest of Rheims as part of the Second Battle of the Marne. It was withdrawn early in August. About September 30, it came back into line northwest of Rheims, near Prouilly and Cormicy. The division remained here, and was driven back, fighting stubbornly near Brimont, Guignicourt and Banogne, until it was withdrawn on November 7, 1918; the same day, Brigadier General Georg von Alt-Stutterheim assumed command. The next day, the division was put back into line on November 8 near Mezières; it had not been withdrawn when the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.

The 50th Infantry Division was rated by the Allies as a first-class division. It distinguished itself in the fighting during 1918. Major Hans von Troilo, the 53rd Infantry Regiment commander, went on to be awarded the Pour le Mérite. General Georg von Engelbrechten, the division commander, also won the Pour le Mérite.

During the entire war, the 53rd Infantry Regiment lost 132 officers, 300 non-commissioned officers and 2,450 enlisted men killed in action. In just the fighting at Verdun, the XV Army Corps, to which the 53rd Infantry Regiment belonged for the battle, lost 93 officers and 2,931 enlisted men killed in action, 291 officers and 14,659 enlisted men wounded in action and 15 officers and 1,735 enlisted men missing in action.

Back to the luger. Given the proximity of the serial numbers serial 1430 d on the barrel and upper receiver and 741 d on the lower receiver, it is quite possible that the pistol with serial number 741 d (and marked with the unit designation) received damage to the barrel and upper receiver during the war and these components were replaced by unit ordnance personnel of the 50th Infantry Division with the barrel and upper receiver from pistol number 1430 d that may have been damaged as well and was stripped of useable parts. Both serial numbers indicate a production month of April 1915.

53rd Infantry Regiment – Vauxstürmer!French MacLean2016-05-18T06:59:36-05:00

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, W-Y

Last Name	First Name	DOB	Place of Birth	Date of Death	Location of Execution	Executioner	Type Execution
Williams	John	Thursday, March 8, 1917	Orlando, Florida	Thursday, April 19, 1945	La Pernelle, Hameau Scipion, Normandy, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Williams	Olin W.	Friday, September 16, 1921	Elloree, South Carolina	Thursday, March 29, 1945	Le Chene Daniel, Manche, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Wilson	J. P.	Thursday, January 24, 1918	Columbus, Mississippi	Friday, February 2, 1945	Lerouville, Meuse, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Wimberly	Willie Jr.	Saturday, September 21, 1912	Macon, Georgia	Wednesday, November 8, 1944	Seine Disciplinary Training Center, Paris, France	Mortimer H. Christian	Hanged
Wray	Robert	Sunday, March 27, 1921	Shelby, North Carolina	Monday, August 20, 1945	Loire Disciplinary Training Center, Le Mans, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Yancy	Waiters			Saturday, February 10, 1945	Bricquebec, Manche, France	John C. Woods	Hanged

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, W-YFrench MacLean2015-09-08T19:17:25-05:00

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, T-W

Last Name	First Name	DOB	Place of Birth	Date of Death	Location of Execution	Executioner	Type Execution
Valentine	Leo Sr.	Thursday, December 4, 1924	Gastonia, North Carolina	Wednesday, November 29, 1944	Beaunay, Marne, France	Henry L. Peck/Woods Assistant	Hanged
Waters	John H.	Sunday, October 1, 1905	Perth Amboy, New Jersey	Thursday, February 10, 1944	Shepton Mallet Prison, England	Thomas Pierrepoint & Alexander Riley	Hanged
Watson	Frank			Saturday, March 3, 1945	La Saussaye, Commune de Bure, Orne, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Watson	Joseph		Texarkana, Texas	Wednesday, November 8, 1944	Seine Disciplinary Training Center, Paris, France	Mortimer H. Christian	Hanged
Watson	Ray			Tuesday, August 29, 1944	PBS Stockade Number 1, Aversa, Italy	Unknown	Hanged
White	Armstead			Monday, August 30, 1943	Termini, Sicily	Joseph V. DePaul Dillon	Hanged
White	David	Saturday, July 12, 1919	Shamrock, Florida	Monday, August 30, 1943	Termini, Sicily	Joseph V. DePaul Dillon	Hanged
Whitfield	Clarence	Thursday, February 7, 1924	Wrightsville, North Carolina	Monday, August 14, 1944	Canisy, France	Thomas Pierrepoint	Hanged

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, T-WFrench MacLean2015-09-08T19:25:19-05:00

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, S-T

Last Name	First Name	DOB	Place of Birth	Date of Death	Location of Execution	Executioner	Type Execution
Spears	Charles E.	Friday, May 20, 1910	Zanesville, Ohio	Wednesday, April 19, 1944	PBS Stockade Number 1, Aversa, Italy	Unknown	Hanged
Spencer	Elwood J.	Thursday, December 4, 1924	Gastonia, North Carolina	Tuesday, January 30, 1945	Fort d’Orange, Citadel, Namur, Belgium	John C. Woods	Hanged
Spinks	Mansfield	Friday, November 7, 1924	Chicago, Illinois	Friday, October 19, 1945	PBS Stockade Number 1, Aversa, Italy	Firing Squad	Shot
Stroud	Harvey L.	Saturday, March 26, 1921	Merrwell, Georgia	Monday, August 30, 1943	Termini, Sicily	Joseph V. DePaul Dillon	Hanged
Taylor	John W.		Mississippi	Tuesday, March 20, 1945	PBS Stockade Number 1, Aversa, Italy	John W. Daschner, William Vassil, Durey G. Ranck	Hanged
Thomas	Madison	Thursday, March 3, 1921	Arnaudville, Louisiana	Thursday, October 12, 1944	Shepton Mallet Prison, England	Thomas Pierrepoint & Albert Pierrepoint	Hanged
Till	Louis		Madrid, Missouri	Monday, July 2, 1945	PBS Stockade Number 1, Aversa, Italy	Three lieutenants	Hanged
Twiggs	James W.	Sunday, January 4, 1920	Topeka, Kansas	Monday, January 22, 1945	Loire Disciplinary Training Center, Le Mans, France	John C. Woods	Hanged

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, S-TFrench MacLean2015-08-28T22:05:03-05:00

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, S

Last Name	First Name	DOB	Place of Birth	Date of Death	Location of Execution	Executioner	Type Execution
Skinner	Robert L.	Tuesday, May 20, 1924	Paris, Tennessee	Saturday, February 10, 1945	Bricquebec, Manche, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Slovik	Eddie	Wednesday, February 18, 1920	Detroit, Michigan	Wednesday, January 31, 1945	Ste. Marie-Aux-Mines, France	Firing Squad	Shot
Smalls	Abraham	Monday, October 31, 1910	Adams, Run South Carolina	Tuesday, March 27, 1945	PBS Stockade Number 1, Aversa, Italy	Unknown	Hanged
Smith	George E. Jr.	Saturday, April 14, 1917	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	Tuesday, May 8, 1945	Shepton Mallet Prison, England	Thomas Pierrepoint & Herbert Morris	Hanged
Smith	John C.	Thursday, September 20, 1917	Bedford County, Virginia	Saturday, March 3, 1945	La Saussaye, Commune de Bure, Orne, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Smith	Willie	Friday, June 30, 1922	Birmingham, Alabama	Friday, August 11, 1944	Shepton Mallet Prison, England	Thomas Pierrepoint	Hanged
Smith	Charles H.	Wednesday, October 6, 1909	Salem, Missouri	Monday, September 6, 1943	Oran, Algeria	Arthur S. Imell	Hanged
Smith	Harold A.	Thursday, January 4, 1923	LaGrange, Georgia	Friday, June 25, 1943	Shepton Mallet Prison, England	Thomas Pierrepoint & Albert Pierrepoint	Hanged

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, SFrench MacLean2015-09-08T19:27:19-05:00

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, P-S

Last Name	First Name	DOB	Place of Birth	Date of Death	Location of Execution	Executioner	Type Execution
Philpot	Henry C.	Friday, June 22, 1917	Redding, California	Monday, September 10, 1945	Loire Disciplinary Training Center, Le Mans, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Pittman	Willie Aron	Monday, August 26, 1918	Campbellton, Florida	Monday, August 30, 1943	Termini, Sicily	Joseph V. DePaul Dillon	Hanged
Pygate	Benjamin	Tuesday, February 2, 1909	Dillon, South Carolina	Tuesday, November 28, 1944	Shepton Mallet Prison, England	Philip J. Flynn (led Firing Squad)	Shot
Robinson	Charles M.	Wednesday, April 4, 1923	Houston, Texas	Friday, September 28, 1945	Loire Disciplinary Training Center, Le Mans, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Rollins	Alvin R.	Friday, December 5, 1924	Chattanooga, Tennessee	Thursday, May 31, 1945	Loire Disciplinary Training Center, Le Mans, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Sanders	James B.	Saturday, June 9, 1917	Lockhart, South Carolina	Wednesday, October 25, 1944	Seine Disciplinary Training Center, Paris, France	Mortimer H. Christian/Woods Assistant	Hanged
Schmiedel	Werner	Sunday, May 4, 1919	Allentown, Pennsylvania	Monday, June 11, 1945	PBS Stockade Number 1, Aversa, Italy	Unknown	Hanged
Scott	Richard B.	Wednesday, August 23, 1916	Carrolton, Texas	Saturday, November 18, 1944	Fort Du Roule, Cherbourg, France	Mortimer H. Christian	Hanged

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, P-SFrench MacLean2015-09-08T19:32:16-05:00

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, M-P

Last Name	First Name	DOB	Place of Birth	Date of Death	Location of Execution	Executioner	Type Execution
Miranda	Alex F.	Saturday, July 28, 1923	Santa Ana, California	Tuesday, May 30, 1944	Shepton Mallet Prison, England	Firing Squad	Shot
Nelson	Henry W.	Friday, March 28, 1924	East St. Louis, Illinois	Thursday, July 5, 1945	PBS Stockade Number 1, Aversa, Italy	Unknown	Hanged
Newman	Oscar N.	Friday, July 19, 1918	Macon, Ohio	Wednesday, November 29, 1944	Beaunay, Marne, France	Henry L. Peck/Woods Assistant	Hanged
Norris	Clete O.	Friday, March 1, 1918	Palestine, Texas	Thursday, May 31, 1945	Loire Disciplinary Training Center, Le Mans, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Ortiz	Victor	Tuesday, January 6, 1914	Coamo, Puerto Rico	Thursday, June 21, 1945	Loire Disciplinary Training Center, Le Mans, France	John C. Woods	Hanged
Parker	Woodrow		Alabama	Monday, October 15, 1945	Les Milles, France (Delta DTC)	Firing Squad	Shot
Pearson	Robert L.	Wednesday, May 30, 1923	Mayflower, Arkansas	Saturday, March 17, 1945	Shepton Mallet Prison, England	Thomas Pierrepoint & Herbert Morris	Hanged
Pennyfeather	William D.	Wednesday, July 21, 1920	New York, New York	Saturday, November 18, 1944	Fort Du Roule, Cherbourg, France	Mortimer H. Christian	Hanged

U.S. Army Executions in Europe during World War II, M-PFrench MacLean2015-09-08T19:29:29-05:00